7:30 am
8:30 am
Eric S. Rosengren
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Giovanni Olivei
Vice President and Economist
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
9:00 am
Before 1990, annual GDP growth during postwar recoveries averaged nearly 4 percent, while it has averaged just above 2 percent in the most recent recovery. This session will assess the role played by different factors in generating a slow recovery, viewed through the lens of a general equilibrium macroeconomic model: To what extent can the widespread tendency of overpredicting GDP growth during the recovery be attributed to factors such as a decline in productivity, a decline in labor force participation, financial headwinds, and/or overly constrained monetary and fiscal policy? What are the headwinds that have mattered most in the slow recovery so far?
10:30 am
11:00 am
Another puzzle associated with this recovery is the significant decline in the unemployment rate despite modest GDP growth. This session will address the extent to which errors in Okun's Law can be explained by a coincident decline in the potential growth rate of the U.S. economy. To what degree have changing demographics, capital accumulation, and technology each contributed to the decline in potential output? Was the decline exacerbated by other features unique to the Great Recession and the recovery that may eventually dissipate going forward? Are there factors at play other than a decline in the economy's potential performance that can help reconcile the evolution of the unemployment rate and GDP growth?
12:30 pm
The Honorable Janet L. Yellen
Chair
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Christopher L. Foote
Senior Economist and Policy Advisor
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
2:30 pm
The Great Recession was accompanied by a noticeable decline in labor force participation, even among the prime working-age population. How much of this decline can be expected to reverse? Is a further tightening of the labor market a precondition for a much stronger rebound in participation? Is the lack of participation the consequence of a rise in the reservation wage or a fall in the market wage? Does it reflect a mismatch of skills? Would retraining programs be an effective tool to bring more people back into the labor force?
4:00 pm
4:15 pm
Consumption growth has been slower than income and wealth, its fundamental drivers, would have predicted. Why has the saving rate increased significantly since the beginning of the recession? One potential explanation is that the recent slow recovery is in large part the outcome of a deep financial crisis, and that once the deleveraging process comes to an end, the average rate of economic growth—after accounting for longer-term demographic developments —will revert to its pre-crisis level. This session will revisit the notion of household deleveraging and its relevance for the recovery so far. Is the process of deleveraging now largely over, or does it have more room to go? Are there other reasons, such as the distribution of the gains to income and wealth across households, which could provide an alternative explanation for the greater saving rate?
5:45 pm
8:00 am
Ricardo P. C. Nunes
Senior Economist and Policy Advisor
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
9:00 am
While it is not unusual for inflation to lag developments in real economic activity, the lag during this recovery has been especially pronounced, with inflation running noticeably below target even near full employment. This session will examine the relevance of alternative explanations for inflation's puzzling behavior. Has downward nominal wage rigidity played an important role in the dynamics of inflation? To what extent has the persistence of an inflation rate below target lowered long-run inflation expectations, and how important are these expectations in the short-term evolution of inflation? Should monetary policy have responded more strongly to changes in long-run inflation expectations?
10:30 am
11:00 am
Did the inflexibility of monetary policy, due to the zero lower bound, and a lack of fiscal stimulus play an important role in the weakness of the recovery? Did limits on traditional countercyclical policy tools contribute to the Great Recession having a lasting effect on the level of economic activity? If there are permanent effects from large recessions, should monetary policy be conducted so as to try to influence the economy's growth outcomes in the medium and longer term? In order to achieve gains that go beyond the short run, how stimulative should the monetary policy stance be, and for how long should it be in place? How should this policy be conducted in order to minimize the costs on the inflation side? Could some of the desired outcomes be reached using fiscal policy instead?
12:30 am
1:30 pm